I provide a full characterization of the set of absolutely expedient learning rules introduced in Börgers, Morales, and Sarin (2004) ["Expedient and monotone learning rules," Econometrica, 72, 383-405]. The expected change in the expected payoff can be written as a quadratic form on the vector of relative expected payoffs of the strategies. This permits use of standard linear algebra arguments to provide a characterization in terms of the matrix defining this quadratic form.
Introduction
Consider a decision maker who chooses within a finite set of strategies according to a given initial probability distribution. After choosing one of these strategies and observing the payoff it yields, she revises the probability of choosing each strategy. Learning models of this nature have been broadly studied, both theoretically and in experiments, to understand how individuals reach observed decisions; see e.g., Fudenberg and Levine (2009) . Learning models studied in the literature are predominantly non-Bayesian and, as such, the class of them that can be devised is large and loose. Börgers, Morales, and Sarin (2004), henceforth BMS (2004), provide a first attempt at studying desirable properties, or axioms, for learning rules. Their first property is absolute expediency, which requires the performance of decisions, in terms of expected payoffs, to improve over time. Formally, a learning rule is absolutely expedient if the expected payoff, computed with the expected value of the revised probability of choosing each strategy, is greater than the expected payoff with the previous probabilities. Since this appealing property tries to set up a criterion to assess the plausibility of learning rules, obtaining a complete characterization is fundamental. The main results in BMS (2004) give necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for absolute expediency, but they do not obtain a full characterization. This note closes this gap by providing a necessary and sufficient condition.
BMS (2004) provide necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for absolute expediency in terms of how the obtained payoff determines the revised probability of choosing each strategy. The necessary condition they find is that absolutely expedient learning rules exhibit positive own-effects, i.e., the revised probability of choosing the strategy chosen in a given period is an increasing function of the payoff this strategy yielded.
1) Their sufficient condition is that cross-effects are negative, i.e., the revised probability of choosing each unchosen strategy is decreasing in the payoff obtained by the chosen strategy.
2) They leave open, however, the question of which learning rules satisfying their necessary conditions but not their sufficient conditions are absolutely expedient. That is, their results are silent about the absolute expediency of learning rules exhibiting built-in similarity, i.e., the revised probability of choosing some non chosen strategies is an increasing function of the payoff yielded by the chosen strategy. They provide examples of learning rules exhibiting built-in similarity and, using direct computations of the expected change in the expected payoff, show that some are absolutely expedient while some are not. This note's main result provides a necessary and sufficient condition on the magnitudes of own-effects and cross-effects for a learning rule to be absolutely expedient. This characterization reveals that absolute expediency requires expected own-effects (i.e., own-effects weighted by the probability of choosing the corresponding strategy) to be relatively large compared to the magnitude of expected cross-effects (i.e., cross-effects weighted by the probability of choosing the corresponding strategy).
To see the intuition of this condition, consider any given strategy. We know that all absolutely expedient learning rules have positive own-effects. This is somewhat intuitive: the higher the payoff yielded by this strategy, the greater the revised probability of choosing it, which has a positive impact on the expected change in the expected payoff. However, the expected change in the probability of choosing this strategy is also determined by cross-effects that are unrelated to its expected payoff and therefore, might have a negative impact on the expected change in the expected payoff. The conditions imposed by the characterization, that the expected own-effects are relatively large compared to the expected cross-effects, guarantee that the overall impact of the own-effects on the expected change in the expected payoff dominates the overall impact of the cross-effects.
Framework
This section describes this note's framework, which is the same as in BMS (2004) .
Environment. A finite set of pure strategies, S = {s 1 , s 2 , ..., s n } with n ≥ 2, is available to the decision maker. If chosen, strategy s i yields a random payoff, with realization x ∈ [0, 1], 1) All these learning rules also satisfy the unbiasedness property. This property was introduced in BMS (2004) and is defined formally below.
2) To be precise, it is also required that every non-empty, strict subset of the set of strategies contains at least one strategy whose revised probability is strictly decreasing in the obtained payoff of at least one strategy that is not in that set. For details, see the Appendix. according to the distribution µ i . A collection (µ i ) i=1,...,n of such payoff distributions is called an environment. The expected payoff of strategy s i is denoted by π i :=´xdµ i ∈ [0, 1] for i = 1, ..., n and we define π := (π i ) i=1,...,n . The analysis is concerned with decisions in two periods. The decision maker's choice in the first period is determined according to an exogenously given vector of probabilities of choosing each strategy, denoted by σ = (σ i ) i=1,...,n , with σ i ∈ (0, 1) for i = 1, ..., n and n i=1 σ i = 1. We assume that the environment is the same in both periods and that the payoff yielded by each strategy in the first period is independent of the payoff yielded by each strategy in the second period.
Learning rules. The decision maker does not know the environment, but she observes the payoff she receives after choosing her strategy in the first period. Her choice in the second period is described by the revised probability of choosing each pure strategy. We define a function called the learning rule, denoted by L : S × [0, 1] → ∆(S). This function maps the strategy chosen in the first period and the obtained payoff to the vector of probabilities of choosing each strategy in the second period. In particular, L(s j , x)(s i ) denotes the probability of choosing strategy s i in the second period, given that strategy s j is chosen in the first period and the payoff x is obtained. Conditional on the event that strategy s j is chosen in the first period, the expected revised probability of choosing strategy
The properties analyzed here are concerned with the expected change in the probability of choosing each strategy. This expected change is given by
for i = 1, ..., n. Similarly we can compute the expected change in the expected payoff of the decision maker, denoted by g, as
As we shall see below, for all the learning rules that we are interested in, the revised probability of choosing each strategy is a linear function of the obtained payoff and f (s i ) is a linear transformation of π for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}. This yields that g is a quadratic transformation of π.
Absolutely Expedient learning rules. Our analysis is concerned with absolutely expedient rules, i.e., learning rules for which, given the probabilities of choosing each strategy in the first period, the decision maker's expected payoff in the second period is greater than her first-period expected payoff.
Definition 1 A learning rule L is absolutely expedient if g > 0 in all environments such that π i = π j for some s i , s j ∈ S.
The next section provides the background for the analysis of g using quadratic forms.
3 Unbiasedness and quadratic forms Lemma 1 in BMS (2004) shows that all absolutely expedient learning rules satisfy the unbiasedness property.
In other words, unbiasedness imposes that the expected change in the probability of choosing each strategy is zero in every environment such that all strategies have the same expected payoff. BMS (2004) provide a characterization of unbiased learning rules. A learning rule L is unbiased if and only if 3) there exist matrices (A ij ) i,j=1,2,...,n and (B ij ) i,j=1,2,...,n such that for all s i ∈ S and x ∈ [0, 1],
for all s j ∈ S \ {s i }, and
Coefficients (B ij ) i,j=1,2,...,n play an important role in the sequel. 5) In particular, (1−σ i )B ii is the derivative of the increase in the probability of choosing strategy s i with respect to the obtained payoff, when this strategy is chosen. That is, for a given σ, B ii determines the impact of the obtained payoff on 'reinforcing' the choice of strategy s i . Similarly, σ i B ji is the derivative of the decrease in the probability of choosing strategy s i with respect to the obtained payoff, when strategy s j (with j = i) is chosen. That is, for a given σ, B ji determines the impact of the obtained payoff on 'deterring' the choice of strategy s i when s j is chosen. We allow for the possibility that B ji < 0, i.e., the higher the payoff obtained with strategy s j , the more likely that strategy s i is chosen in the next period. If this is the case, then we say that the learning rule exhibits built-in similarity between strategies s i and s j .
3) Oyarzun and Sarin (2013) provide an alternative characterization of unbiased learning rules. Their approach considers stochastic dominance criteria instead of expected values and they show that a learning rule is unbiased if and only if it satisfies a property related to risk-neutral learning. 4) Since revised probabilities of choosing each strategy sum to one, conditions (3) and (4) imply A ii = n j=1 σ j A ij and B ii = n j=1 σ j B ij for i = 1, ..., n. 5) In contrast, condition (5) imply that the coefficients A ij for i, j = 1, 2, ..., n cancel out in the computation of the expected change in the probability of choosing each strategy and hence are irrelevant for the subsequent analysis.
If L is unbiased, plugging equations (3)- (6) in (1), and (1) in (2), the expected change in the expected payoff can be written as
As we shall see below, this expression provides the key for the characterization of absolutely expedient learning rules.
Matrix-based approach. Expression (7) allows us to write the expected change in the expected payoff as a quadratic transformation of the vector of expected payoffs of the strategies. In particular, if L is unbiased, then there exists a matrix Q ≡ (q ij ) i,j∈{1,...,n} such that for all π ∈ [0, 1] n , g = π Qπ,
, is the expected own-effect of strategy s i , i.e., the probability of choosing strategy s i times the marginal effect of the obtained payoff on the revised probability of choosing strategy s i , when this strategy is chosen. The ij th -offdiagonal term of Q, −σ i σ j B ij , is the expected cross-effect of strategy s i on strategy s j , i.e., the probability of choosing strategy s i times the marginal effect of the obtained payoff on the revised probability of choosing strategy s j , when s i is chosen.
The first product in the quadratic form, π Q, provides a row-vector whose i th -element is f (s i ), the expected change in the probability of choosing strategy s i . Taking the inner product between this row-vector and π, we obtain g, the expected change in the expected payoff. Therefore, absolute expediency requires the vector of the expected changes in the probability of choosing each strategy and the vector of expected payoffs to be similar, in the sense that they have to be in the same half-space so that their inner product is positive.
The characterization provided in the next section shows that a learning rule is absolutely expedient if and only if all sub-matrixes of Q, obtained by deleting the row and column corresponding to any strategy, are positive definite.
Characterization of absolute expediency
Let Q −k := (q ij ) i,j∈{1,...,n}\{k} , for k = 1, ..., n. The following result characterizes absolute expediency.
Proposition 1 A learning rule L is absolutely expedient if and only if it is unbiased and Q −k is positive definite for all k ∈ {1, ..., n}.
The conditions on Q of this characterization translate into several restrictions, in terms of the expected own-and cross-effects (determined by σ and the coefficients (B ij ) i,j=1,2,...,n ), whose intuition is discussed in detail in the next section. This characterization also provides a direct test for absolute expediency. We just need to compute the matrices Q −k for k = 1, ..., n and verify that they are positive definite. As we shall see below, however, assessing the positive definiteness of only one of these matrices is sufficient.
The intuition of the proof of this proposition is as follows. As the argument reveals, for any strategy s k and environment such that π k ∈ (0, 1), we can write g as a function of the 'relative' expected payoffs (π i − π k ) i =k . This function has a critical point where all expected payoffs are the same and, by definition, this function equals zero at this point. The proof also reveals that this function's Hessian matrix is Q −k + Q −k . Therefore, we need Q −k + Q −k to be positive definite to guarantee that the critical point is a strict minimizer, and g > 0 when not all expected payoffs are the same. Since
for all z ∈ R n−1 , Q −k + Q −k is positive definite if and only if Q −k is positive definite, and this yields the result. The fact that Q −k and its symmetric part, 1 2 Q −k + Q −k , yield the same quadratic form is used often in the sequel, because several results useful for our analysis are available only for symmetric matrixes. Note that we do not assume B ij = B ji for any i = j. Next is the formal proof.
Proof. Necessity. BMS (2004) show that every absolutely expedient learning rule is unbiased, so we consider an unbiased learning rule L and show that it needs to satisfy that Q −k is positive definite for k = 1, ..., n to be absolutely expedient. Fix k ∈ {1, ..., n}, consider an environment with π k ∈ (0, 1), and define t := (t i ) i∈{1,...,n}\{k} , with t i := π i − π k for i ∈ {1, ..., n}. The expression for g in (2) is unchanged if we replace the expected payoffs, π i , with the relative expected payoffs, t i , for i ∈ {1, ..., n}. Since t k = 0, we obtain
Define ϕ : R n−1 → R, with ϕ(z) = z Q −k z for all z ∈ R n−1 , and observe that
If all strategies have the same expected payoff, then t = t * := 0 (n−1)×1 , g = 0, and (10) implies ϕ(t * ) = 0. Furthermore, t * is a critical point of ϕ because the gradient of ϕ, denoted by ∇ϕ, is given by
for all z ∈ R n−1 . Since we consider an environment such that π k ∈ (0, 1), absolute expediency requires ϕ(t * ) = 0 to be a strict local minimum of ϕ. Therefore, the Hessian of ϕ, given by Q −k + Q −k , must be positive definite and hence, Q −k must also be positive definite.
Sufficiency. As above, consider an unbiased learning rule L, fix k ∈ {1, ..., n}, and suppose Q −k is positive definite. Then, with t as defined above, we obtain g = t Q −k t. If π i = π j for some strategies s i , s j ∈ S, then t = 0 (n−1)×1 and the positive definiteness of Q −k yields g > 0.
6)
Two observations follow immediately from the proof. First, the argument for necessity shows that, if the learning rule L is absolutely expedient, Q −k must be positive definite for all k ∈ {1, ..., n}. On the other hand, from the proof for sufficiency, we have that, if Q −k is positive definite for some k ∈ {1, ..., n}, then L is absolutely expedient. This reveals that if Q −k is positive definite for some k ∈ {1, ..., n}, then Q −k is positive definite for all k ∈ {1, ..., n}. Therefore, checking the positive definiteness of Q −k for only one strategy s k is enough to assess whether a learning rule is absolutely expedient.
Second, BMS (2004) call learning rules such that B ii is strictly positive for i = 1, ..., n, own-positive, and show that all absolutely expedient learning rules satisfy this property. Here, we observe that the positive definiteness of Q −k implies that all its diagonal elements are strictly positive. Thus, if Q −k is positive definite for all k ∈ {1, ..., n}, then B ii is strictly positive for i = 1, ..., n. Therefore, our characterization provides an alternate proof of the necessity of own-positiveness for absolutely expediency. These two observations are collected in the following remark.
Remark 1 If L is unbiased and Q −k is positive definite for some k ∈ {1, ..., n}, then: (i) Q −i is positive definite for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}, and (ii) L is own-positive.
A first application of Proposition 1 provides a simple proof of essentially the same statement as part (ii) of Proposition 3 in BMS (2004). In particular, if a learning rule is unbiased and its cross-effects are strictly negative, then it is absolutely expedient.
Corollary 1 If L is unbiased and B ij > 0 for all i, j = 1, ..., n, then L is absolutely expedient.
Proof. For any k ∈ {1, ..., n}, (6) and the hypothesis imply B ii > n j=1,j =k σ j B ji , and the fact that revised probabilities sum to one imply B ii > n j=1j =k σ j B ij . This yields that the symmetric matrix Q −k + Q −k is strictly diagonally dominant and, hence, positive definite for k = 1, ..., n.
7) Thus, Proposition 1 implies that L is absolutely expedient. The counterpart of this result in BMS (2004) is slightly stronger, as they allow some coefficients B ij to be zero. The peculiar nature of their result makes it difficult to fully derive it directly from standard linear algebra results such as those used in the proof of Corollary 1. Yet, as shown in the Appendix, the matrix-based approach provides a shortcut to derive their result completely. The characterization in Proposition 1, however, also allows for some of the coefficients B ij to be negative, as the example in the next section illustrates.
Expected own-and cross-effects' magnitudes
Conditions on expected own-and cross-effects. This section discusses the restrictions imposed by absolute expediency, expressed directly in terms of σ and the coefficients 6) An earlier version of this note worked with a construction using the relative expected payoffs, π i /π k , instead of π i − π k . Keiichi Kawai suggested the simple construction provided here. 7) See, e.g., Quarteroni, Sacco, and Saleri (2007).
(B ij ) i,j=1,2,...,n of the representation in equations (3)- (6) . Now, we show that the positive definiteness of Q −n requires the expected own-effects to be positive and relatively large with respect to the magnitude of the expected cross-effects. The positive definiteness of Q −n can be assessed using Sylvester's criterion (see, e.g., Gilbert 1991): all principal minors of 1 2 Q −n + Q −n must be strictly positive. The restrictions on the first and second principal minors yield
and
respectively. In the same manner, using Laplace expansion to compute higher-order principal minors (if any), we obtain that, in general, the principal minors of Q −n are strictly positive if the expected own-effects are large enough compared to the magnitude of the expected cross-effects.
8)
Intuition. Recall that (2) may be re-written as
, where t i = π i − π n is the relative expected payoff of strategy s i for i = 1, ..., n − 1. For simplicity, consider an environment where all strategies have different expected payoffs and π n = n i=1 σ i π i , so the expected payoff of strategies with a positive (negative) relative expected payoff is greater (smaller) than the first-period expected payoff n i=1 σ i π i .
9) If the expected change in the probability of choosing each strategy s i is positive (negative) when its relative expected payoff t i is positive (negative), then we would have f (s i )t i > 0, which would have a positive impact on the expected change in the expected payoff, yielding g > 0 in (13). This would be the case if Q −n were a diagonal matrix: since the expected own-effects σ i (1 − σ i )B ii are strictly positive for i = 1, ..., n, and t · Q −n provides a row-vector with i th -element f (s i ), f (s i ) and t i would have the same sign, and this would yield g > 0. In other words, if a learning rule is own-positive and the expected change in the probability of choosing each strategy were determined only by its own-effect -the only effect based on information on the expected payoff of each strategy-then the learning rule would be absolutely expedient. Q −n is, however, typically non-diagonal, because some cross-effects are different from zero. Therefore, the expected change in the probability of choosing each strategy is not only determined by its own-effect, but also by cross-effects 8) The sign of the sum of the expected cross-terms, σ 1 σ 2 B 12 + σ 2 σ 1 B 21 , plays no direct role in these conditions. It is the absolute value of this sum that needs to be relatively small compared to the expected own-effects. These conditions are automatically satisfied when B ij > 0 for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} \ {i} and i ∈ {1, ..., n}, as implied by the argument in the proof of Corollary 1. When some of these coefficients are negative, however, condition (12) may be binding, as the example below illustrates.
9) The argument in the subsequent discussion follows in general, defining the relative expected payoffs with respect to any of the strategies with the highest expected payoff that is less than or equal to n i=1 σ i π i . The assumption that all expected payoffs are different just rules out trivial cases.
not dependent upon the expected payoff of that strategy and that therefore might have a negative impact on the expected change in the expected payoff. The large magnitude of expected own-effects imposed by Proposition 1, however, guarantees that expected own-effects dominate expected cross-effects and, hence, yield g > 0. We illustrate this intuition in the analysis of the following example.
Example. Consider an unbiased learning rule L with three strategies that satisfies (3)-(6) for some matrices (A ij ) i,j=1,2,3 and (B ij ) i,j=1,2,3 .
10) Examples with more strategies can be handled in the same way. The learning rule analyzed here is a generalized version of Example 2 in BMS (2004). It allows for built-in similarity, i.e., there are two strategies, s 1 and s 2 , such that the revised probability of choosing one strategy is increasing in the payoff yielded by the other. In particular,
for i, j = 1, 2, with j = i; where k and l are strictly positive real numbers that may depend on σ, so that all revised probabilities are contained in [0, 1]. The representation of this learning rule using equations (3)- (4) yields A ij = 0 for i, j = 1, 2, B 11 = B 22 = k, and the cross-coefficients between strategies s 1 and s 2 ,
This defines completely the learning rule because all other parts of L can be obtained using equations (5) and (6) , and the fact that n j=1 L(s i , x)(s j ) = 1 for all s i ∈ S and x ∈ [0, 1]. The first principal minor of (Q −3 + Q −3 )/2 is σ 1 (1 − σ 1 )k > 0. Straightforward computations reveal that the second principal minor of (Q −3 + Q −3 )/2 is strictly positive if and only if
Condition (14) reveals the required magnitude of the expected own-effects for L to be absolutely expedient. To illustrate how absolute expediency may fail if (14) is not satisfied, consider the probabilities of choosing each strategy given by σ 1 = σ 2 = σ 3 = 1/3. For this vector σ, condition (14) is equivalent to k > l. Suppose instead k = 1/10 and l = 1/5, and consider any environment such that π 1 = 1, π 2 = 0 and π 3 = 1/2. In such an environment, the relative expected payoffs of strategies s 1 and s 2 , with respect to strategy s 3 , are t 1 = 1/2 and
, we need f (s 1 ) > f (s 2 ) for g to be strictly positive. Yet, computing (t 1 , t 2 ) Q −3 yields f (s 1 ) = −1/90 and f (s 2 ) = 1/90. Intuitively, since the own-effects are relatively small compared to the cross-effects between strategies s 1 and s 2 , the relatively high payoff of strategy s 1 increases more the probability of choosing strategy s 2 in the second period than the probability of choosing s 1 , even 10) In problems with two strategies, absolute expediency is equivalent to the property of monotonicity, fully characterized in BMS (2004). For a brief discussion of monotone learning rules, see the Appendix. though π 2 = 0, ultimately yielding g < 0. This possibility would be ruled out if B ij > 0 for all s i , s j ∈ S (no built-in similarity), or if B 12 < 0 and B 21 < 0, but with relatively small magnitudes compared to B 11 and B 22 , as prescribed by condition (14) (mild built-in similarity).
Börgers, Morales, and Sarin (2001) derive condition (14) for absolute expediency using longer computations showing that the minimum of g as a function of π 1 , π 2 , and π 3 is zero and is achieved only when π 1 = π 2 = π 3 . Therefore, this example illustrates the computational advantages of the characterization in Proposition 1 to assess absolute expediency: we need not compute g in any environment, it is sufficient to check that the coefficients (B ij ) i,j=1,...,n and σ yield a matrix Q −k satisfying Sylvester's criterion. Perhaps more importantly, this characterization provides a method to assess this property that can always be directly applied.
Conclusion
The expected change in the expected payoff of unbiased learning rules can be written as a quadratic form on the vector of expected payoffs of each strategy. This representation allows us to characterize absolutely expedient learning rules as those whose corresponding quadratic form matrix has a positive definite upper-left corner (n − 1) × (n − 1) sub-matrix. This implies that absolute expediency requires the expected own-effects to be relatively large compared to the magnitude of expected crossed-effects. This characterization permits use of experimental data to assess the relevance of this property in the analysis of human behavior. In particular, one could test whether the own-effects of an individual's learning rule are as large as absolute expediency requires. This is an interesting subject for future research.
Appendix
BMS (2004) also introduce a property called monotonicity. A learning rule is monotone if the sum of the expected changes in the probability of choosing the strategies with the highest expected payoff is strictly positive. Let S * = {s i ∈ S : π i ≥ π j ∀s j ∈ S}; formally, a learning rule is monotone if s i ∈S * f (s i ) > 0 whenever π i = π j for some s i , s j ∈ S. BMS (2004) show that a learning rule is monotone if and only if it is unbiased, B ij ≥ 0 for all s i , s j ∈ S; and for all non-empty strict-subset C of S there are strategies s i ∈ C and s j ∈ S \ C such that B ij > 0.
It is a straightforward corollary from Proposition 3 of BMS (2004) that all monotone rules are absolutely expedient. This Appendix provides a short alternate proof of this fact that relies on the techniques developed in this note.
Proposition 2 Every monotone learning rule is absolutely expedient.
Proof. Since g = π Thus, g = − n i=1 n j=1,j =i σ i σ j q ij (π i − π j ) π i . Therefore,
Since q ij ≤ 0 for all i = j with strict inequality at least for some s i ∈ S * and s j ∈ S \ S * , we conclude that g > 0.
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